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COURTING DISASTER
Lawrence G. Sager*
I. FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
At bottom, Larry Kramer's book' is a history of the interaction
between courts and other political actors over contentious questions
of fundamental justice in the United States. In Kramer's hands, there
are no magic moments of empowerment, but rather, bits of an
ongoing story of contention and fleeting resolution. Judicial authority
to interpret and enforce the Constitution did not spring whole from
the enactment of that document. Important foundations for the
authority of courts to take up questions of justice were laid before the
Constitution came into being and made itself heir to their influence.
And the ratification of the Constitution-and its reparative caboose,
the Bill of Rights-did not instantiate judicial review in anything like
its full modern form, notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause,2 which
clearly directs state judges to measure state behavior against the
Constitution's terms. Throughout much of our constitutional history,
serious questions have been raised about the scope and finality of the
Supreme Court's judgments. Some of those challenges have raised
honest questions of institutional authority; others have been borne
primarily on the shoulders of brute political force.
The history of all this is undoubtedly too easily neglected by many
of us, and less than fully understood even by those who are careful not
to neglect it. I am far from competent to judge, but my strong
suspicion is that Kramer's history makes a fine contribution to the
ongoing project of placing our nation's political life in useful historical
perspective. I have no doubt that his history, like all histories-even
very good histories-will suffer or enjoy the fruits of revisionary visits
by subsequent historians. That, after all, is in the nature of the
discipline. But The People Themselves will rightfully be regarded as
an important contribution to our self-understanding, and with it,
Kramer will have cemented his already strong reputation as an
original and deep observer of our political past.
* Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin.
1. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (2004).
2. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Kramer's book ends on a different note. In what amounts to a
heated postscript, he decries the sad state in which we find ourselves,
with "the people" and their elected officials in the habit of supine
acceptance of the judgmental authority of the Supreme Court;3 and he
calls for a much greater willingness to strike back at an errant Court.4
Only at this point is there a collision between Kramer's history and
the account of American constitutional practice that I set out in
Justice in Plainclothes.' But Kramer's history is meant to create an
atmosphere that is congenial to the embrace of his heated concluding
observations, and my deep doubts about those observations reflect
back on the history. It is with these reflected doubts that I will begin.
II. TEMPORAL BIAS
One obvious feature of Kramer's history is the degree to which it is
temporally loaded. Kramer may have thought that his audience
needed to be drawn away from a presentist bias, pursuant to which we
imagine that things have always been as they are, and distort our past
to reduce its distinctiveness. He, in any event, has strained to do
precisely the reverse. His history is like Saul Steinberg's map of the
United States through the eyes of a New Yorker, where everything
west of the Hudson River is compressed to a nub.6 Kramer dwells
lovingly over our time before the enactment of the Constitution
proper,7 sees much that is important in our experience with courts as
spent by the time of Marbury v. Madison,8 and is only fleetingly
interested in events that postdate the nineteenth century.9
When I turned fifty, I was jolted by the realization that the
Constitution was only about four times my age. Optimist that I am, I
took from this epiphany not the fear that old age loomed, but the
insight that our national experiment in constitutional democracy is
still remarkably young. Kramer has effectively lopped off the second
half of our life under the Constitution, which makes less plausible his
history-wise discomfort with where we-on his account -suddenly
find ourselves.
The one twentieth-century ganglia of events that does figure
importantly in Kramer's narrative is the approach to constitutional
questions forged during the New Deal and famously announced in
footnote four of the Court's decision in United States v. Carolene
3. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 228.
4. Id. at 247-48.
5. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American
Constitutional Practice (2004).
6. See Saul Steinberg, View of the World from 9th Avenue, New Yorker, Mar. 29,
1976, at cover, available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/prints-steinberg_0376.asp.
7. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 9-34.
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 114-16, 127.
9. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 214-48.
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Products Co.10 The Carolene Products approach is binary: In most
areas of constitutional concern, the Court would give the decisions of
other governmental actors substantial deference and seldom
intervene; but in the enforcement of familiar modern civil rights, the
Court would pursue an active and independent role of enforcement."
Kramer characterizes this as a "settlement," and seems on first
meeting to endorse the Court's posture of self-limitation." By the
time we get to his angry postscript, however, Kramer seems to be
inviting legislative attacks on the Court in precisely those areas of
judicial activity that the settlement endorses. 13 We will look in on that
question when we turn to the postscript itself.
III. MISSING WARTS
There is another obvious feature of Kramer's history that bears
mention. Presumably, that history is meant in part to make what
Kramer calls "popular constitutionalism" - which we will consider
below-more credible and palatable by reminding us that the
Republic did just fine in times when that form of constitutional
authority prevailed in practice. 4 But history can do that only if it
fairly represents our national experience under popularly-inflected
constitutionalism, warts and all. In Kramer's rendition of our past, the
popular constitutional warts are strangely suppressed. Where, for
example, is the First Amendment of World War I, when the courts
were inclined to defer to popular legislative judgment and permit the
repression of political speech on the grounds that it might harm the
war effort? 5 Or, for that matter, what of the First Amendment in the
McCarthy era, when the Supreme Court bent its judgment to national
hysteria? 6 What of the Court's deference to congressional and
military judgment in World War II that linked national security to the
forced relocation of Japanese-Americans into concentration camps? 7
And how is it that Kramer lingers critically over Cooper v. Aaron-
where, in response to naked, armed defiance of judicial mandate, the
Court famously declared itself "supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution" 8-but somehow fails to remind us that Governor
Faubus's military stand at the schoolhouse door in Little Rock was
merely a particularly vivid manifestation of the century-long pattern
10. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 219-20
(discussing the New Deal settlement).
11. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
12. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 219-20.
13. See id. at 227-33.
14. See id. at 8.
15. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
16. See, e.g, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
18. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 221.
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of intense, mean-spirited, and violence-prone resistance by states in
the South to the commands of constitutional equality?
IV. ALPHA LIONS AND BETA LAMBS
These concerns about the completeness and fairness of the
historical record in Kramer's hands are, as I have said, pretty obvious,
and they are likely to be common critical grist in responses to The
People Themselves. But let us take the record as given, for a moment,
and consider how it should be read. There is one not-so-obvious
feature of that record that goes unremarked by Kramer and which
may be quite important. Suppose we draw a rough distinction
between two sorts of constitutional disagreements. In "Alpha"
conflicts, a governmental act or practice is found by the Supreme
Court to be unconstitutional, but other governmental actors disagree.
In "Beta" conflicts, a governmental act or practice is found by the
Supreme Court to be constitutional, and other governmental actors
disagree. Alpha and Beta disagreements have very different valences
in our constitutional practice.
Alpha disagreements are where the wild things are. They create
true conflicts between the Court, which mandates X, and another
governmental actor that insists on doing something at sharp odds with
X. Alpha disagreements are often driven by strong popular resistance
to the Court's rulings. And it is Alpha disagreements-over the
pledge of allegiance, gay rights, flag burning, abortion, school prayer,
and racial integration of the public schools-that can produce the
impulse to strip the courts of jurisdiction, to pack the Court, to
impeach a Justice or two, or to order National Guard troops to brace
themselves against the peril of black students entering a racially-
pristine high school.
By their nature, Beta disagreements are far more benign. What
they tend to create is a proliferation or redundancy of veto-gates in
the name of the limited number of claims of political justice that
plausibly can be attributed to the Constitution. Their benign
character can be brought out by several observations. Consider first
state liberty-bearing constitutional provisions that have federal
equivalents-say free speech or equal protection. State courts are
perfectly free to read state liberty-bearing provisions as underwriting
constitutional intervention in circumstances under which the federal
courts would find no federal constitutional warrant for intervention.
The only limitation on this freedom is at the point at which a state
reading puts the state constitution in conflict with federal provisions.
At that point, Beta disagreements become Alpha disagreements. This
would have been true, for example, if California shopping center
owners had been correct in their assertion that the application of state
[Vol. 731364
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free speech provisions to their private establishments violated
property interests protected by the United States Constitution. 19 State
courts even are free to enlarge on federal court interpretations of the
Constitution if their rulings are protected by independent and
adequate state grounds.
But leave state courts and state constitutions to the side, for the
moment. Now imagine that we are unsure as to whether Congress,
the President, state actors, and the people at large are or are not free
to expand upon the Supreme Court's understanding of the
Constitution. Consider, from the vantage of the justifications for
behavior and the consequences of that behavior, how relatively
modest is the difference between a regime in which nonjudicial actors
are so free and one in which they are not. In the not-free-to-act-on-
Beta-disagreements-with-the-Court regime, Presidents would veto on
the grounds of great political injustice; Congress would similarly
restrain itself from enacting measures that were in some particular
fundamentally unjust; the people would vote offenders out of office,
and state courts and actors would find similar conceptual equivalents,
including, where appropriate, state constitutional restraints on state
and local actors. Now, if we permit all of those actors access to the
federal Constitution for justification, not so very much will have
changed.
Beta disagreements can be seen to some extent as reflecting
different institutional capacities or sensitivities, and as fulfilling a
division of labor among constitutional actors. This is made explicit by
the political question doctrine, for example, and by the
underenforcement thesis, which I advance in Justice in Plainclothes.°
It is all but impossible to imagine a world where nonjudicial actors
like Congress were deprived of independent constitutional authority
and/or absolved of independent constitutional responsibility, or even a
world in which Congress were, as a practical matter, largely
unconcerned with matters of constitutional substance.
As with state courts and state constitutions, Beta disagreements
about the content of the Federal Constitution can, under special
circumstances, become Alpha disagreements. This can happen when
an extension of the liberty-bearing provisions of the Constitution is
perceived by the Court as violating the Constitution. For example,
Chris Eisgruber and I are inclined to agree with Justice Stevens, who
sees the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's radical privileging of
more-or-less orthodox religious belief over other deep human
commitments as transgressing the Establishment Clause."' They can
19. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
20. See Sager, supra note 5, at 84-128.
21. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (1994).
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become Alpha disagreements in a somewhat less direct way as well:
When, as now, the Court adopts a fairly strict reading of Congress's
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,2  an
attempt by Congress to legislate an enlarged reading of a provision of
the Constitution becomes, in the Court's eyes, an overreaching of
Congress's authority to legislate, as an enumerated powers matter.
Now here is the point of this Alpha/Beta ramble: The bulk of
Kramer's evocations of our constitutional past-in both practice and
articulated theory-are Beta rather than Alpha instances of the
refusal to give the judiciary decisive authority over matters of
constitutional substance. This is true, for example, even of Kramer's
three introductory examples of how "Americans of the Founding era"
took themselves to be constitutionally responsible agents:
constitutionally-inspired jury nullification; mob disdain for Hamilton's
call for confidence in the judgmental capacity of the President and the
Senate regarding the Jay treaty; and popular state repudiations of the
Alien Act.23 It is true of the various examples of grand and petit juries
balking at the enforcement of what were perceived to be
unconstitutional laws, including the famous acquittal of John Peter
Zenger;24 and even of the exercise of "mob" authority on the occasion
of the Boston Tea Party,25 and James Wilson's ringing defense of the
authority of a conscientious citizen to disobey an unconstitutional
law;26 and of the ratification debates, in which "[e]ven those
sympathetic to judicial review emphasized politics as the primary,
essential, and indispensable [constitutional] safeguard. 27
More to the point, perhaps, Kramer's most prominent examples of
the rejection of "judicial supremacy" in the name of departmentalism,
once judicial review had taken firm root in our constitutional
tradition, are classic instances of Beta disagreement. Take, for
example, Jackson's veto on constitutional grounds of the legislation
that would have rechartered the National Bank, despite the Court's
prior finding that the bank was constitutional. This event looms very
large in Kramer's narrative.2  But when Jackson renounces the
authority of the "'opinion of the judges' over Congress and the
President,29 this is classic Beta material. Jackson is not asserting the
authority of either branch to defy the mandate of the Court or
22. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
23. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 3-5.
24. See id. at 28-29.
25. See id. at 27.
26. See id. at 44.
27. See id. at 84.
28. See id. at 183-84.
29. See id. at 183 (quoting Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A




questioning the reach of the Court's mandate; he is merely insisting on
the propriety of Congress declining to renew the Bank or his own veto
of the Bank's renewal on constitutional grounds.3' Even Van Buren,
who is very much Kramer's hero, seems to have focused on the Beta
independence of Congress and the President. Van Buren is lauded by
Kramer as having quoted with favor a speech defending the veto of
the Bank.3' And that speech, at its operational core, is pure Beta
authority; in it, Senator Hugh Lawson White insists that a decision of
the Supreme Court like that approving the Bank "'does not bind
either the Congress or the President,"' and that either is free
thereafter to decline to perform an official act on the ground that to
do so, in their conscientious belief, would be to act
unconstitutionally.32
Lincoln's refusal to be bound by the Supreme Court's view of black
citizenship in Dred Scott33 is an attenuated form of Alpha
disagreement. But, as Kramer emphasizes, Lincoln's assertion of the
prerogative of independent presidential judgment under these
extraordinary circumstances was remarkably mild.34 Where "vital
questions, affecting the whole people" are at stake, and where the
Court's judgment on those questions is made in "ordinary". "personal
actions," then the President is not bound "the instant" the judgment is
made.35 Lincoln never suggested that governmental parties to public
litigation are at all free to disobey the Court, and appears to have
believed that a firmly etched line of Supreme Court judgments would
be binding on all within its normative purview.36 This puts Lincoln
much closer to Cooper v. Aaron3' and the dreaded "judicial
supremacy" than it is to anything Kramer comes to advocate in the
name of popular constitutionalism. Kramer explains the paleness of
Lincoln's assertion of independent judgmental authority by noting
that most of what the Court otherwise was prepared to do in the name
of the Constitution involved bringing the states to heel, which Lincoln
favored.3 But there is more than a small trace of the ad hoc in this
explanation, given the extraordinary disrepute into which the Dred
Scott decision quickly fell.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 201.
32. See id. (quoting Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origins and Courts of
Political Parties in the United States 329-30 (1867)).
33. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
34. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 212-13.
35. Id. at 212 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861),
in Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 579, 585-86 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
paperback ed. 1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. See id.
37. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
38. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 212-13.
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We need to be clear on where we are in the historical bidding:
Kramer is arguing that "judicial supremacy" in our constitutional
practice has always been balanced or overwhelmed by various forms
of popular constitutionalism, in particular by departmentalism.39 On
the Mount Rushmore of popular constitutionalism, Kramer would
carve the visages of Jefferson, Jackson, and Van Buren.40 But, on
Kramer's report, Jackson and Van Buren, the heroes of
departmentalism, are classic Beta lambs, not Alpha lions. Lincoln is
almost everyone's hero; but his example lends no serious support to
Kramer's call for attacking the Court.
Now it may or may not be that the dense tapestry of our
constitutional experience would yield convincing instances of Alpha
disagreement were Kramer to take a second look. But whether
Kramer could succeed in a second look is beside the point. Kramer's
history surely cannot persuade us as a matter of direct authority: Lots
of things happened in our past, including quite bad things that we
should not be tempted to repeat. That the Court was defied at some
point in the past is not a claim for how the Court should be regarded
today. But Kramer is not, I think, offering the past as authority for his
complaint about the present. Kramer echoes Richard Parker in
suggesting that at bottom these questions about the division of
constitutional labor are "a matter of sensibility., 41 The examples of
Jackson and Van Buren are meant to stoke our popular political
sensibilities. To do that, they have to be appealing events, not merely
past events. But if Jackson and Van Buren are appealing, it is
precisely because they represent Beta redundancy of judgment, not
Alpha defiance and disorder. And for just that reason, they cannot
offer support for the litany of Alpha strokes of discord, the absence of
which is lamented by Kramer-impeaching the Justices, packing the
Court, stripping it of jurisdiction, blighting it with consuming burdens,
or neutering it with disabling procedures.
Setting history aside, the Alpha/Beta distinction is important going
forward. I have avoided using the phrase "judicial supremacy," which
is so important to Kramer, 42 because I am unsure what is or is not
entailed in that phrase. To the extent that "judicial supremacy" is a
theory that condemns Beta judgmental redundancy, Kramer and I
agree that "judicial supremacy" is a mistake. The political question
doctrine, the underenforcement thesis,43 and the phenomenon of
judicial deference all depend upon and fortify the license of
nonjudicial actors to apply the Constitution more stringently than
39. See id. at 106-11, 208.
40. See id. at 208.
41. See id. at 241-45 (quoting Richard Parker, "Here, the People Rule": A
Constitutional Populist Manifesto 4 (1994)).
42. See id. at 128-44.
43. See Sager, supra note 5, at 84-128.
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would the Court. I doubt that there are good arguments against such
Beta license; and Beta license does not require that we fold, spindle,
or mutilate the constitutional judiciary.
V. UNFORTUNATE RHETORIC
Perhaps because Kramer is of the view that questions of
institutional authority and responsibility are at bottom questions of
populist and anti-populist sensibility, he permits a bit of inflammatory
rhetoric to serve as the heart of the argument in his prescriptive
postscript:
Simply put, supporters of judicial supremacy are today's
aristocrats. Once [sic] can say this without being disparaging,
meaning only to connect modern apologists for judicial authority
with that strand in American thought that has always been
concerned first and foremost with "the excess of democracy."
The question Americans must ask themselves is whether they are
comfortable handing their Constitution over to the forces of
aristocracy: whether they share this lack of faith in themselves and
their fellow citizens, or whether they are prepared to assume once
again the full responsibilities of self-government."
(All those in favor of aristocracy and against self-government,
please raise your hands!)
Now we are into territory where Kramer and I clearly disagree, not
least about the characterization of our disagreement. There are three
questions that need to be explored: (1) Do courts have some
epistemic advantage in the enterprise of realizing the fundamental
requirements of political justice? (2) Is the robust use of courts in
furtherance of this enterprise consistent with a commitment to
democracy? (3) Would we be better or worse off if Congress were
more disposed than it presently is to act on its disagreements with the
Supreme Court by impeaching Justices, stripping the Court of
jurisdiction, shrinking or expanding the size of the Court, or
encumbering the Court with disabling procedures or responsibilities?
None of these questions is illuminated, I believe, by the oppositional
vocabulary of aristocracy and self-government.
In Justice in Plainclothes, I argue that courts are reasonably well-
suited-and in some respects, better suited than legislatures-to
pursue questions concerning the fundamental requirements of
political justice.45  I base this claim on three propositions. First,
impartiality: Federal judges (and world-wide, many high court judges)
44. Kramer, supra note 1, at 247.
45. See Sager, supra note 5, at 199.
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are appointed rather than elected; more importantly perhaps, judges
in many legal systems are made impartial by virtue of their obligation
to articulate reasons for their decisions and to abide by those
announced reasons in other cases.46 Second, specialization and
redundancy: Constitutional judges are like narrowly-focused quality
control inspectors.47 And third, reflective equilibration: Common law
judges enjoy the epistemic discipline of coherence.48
Now, in no useful way can these claims on behalf of courts be
characterized as emanating from a case of aristocratic jitters. They
are arguments on behalf of a set of political institutions that are
structured so as to give us reason to hope that they will arrive at sound
decisions in a narrowly circumscribed but important set of cases. This
case for the epistemic virtues of adjudication is not beyond question.
But it is sufficiently formidable to demand a response. The rhetoric of
we/they or elite/masses does not offer a response. We are all in this
political soup together, whether we sit as judges, serve as legislators,
educate those who do these things, or merely assume the office of
voter and participate in elections. In none of these roles are we
entirely free to govern ourselves as individuals, as forty-nine percent
of the people who participated in our recent presidential election are
painfully aware.49 In none of these roles are we or those in our
judgmental cohort free from mistakes. But the different settings in
which we as a people make decisions have different epistemic virtues
and liabilities, which may help explain why constitutional courts were
so attractive to the nations of Europe in the wake of World War II,
and why they are so attractive to most of the democratic world today.
In Justice in Plainclothes, I argue that courts offer a distinct set of
democratic virtues that we cannot realistically expect from
legislatures." There is nothing mystical or perverse about this claim.
The idea is simply that when a constitutional claimant stands before a
court, the force of her claim does not turn on the number of votes or
dollars she can muster for her cause.51 Instead, the force of her claim
consists in the success of her appeal to a scheme of articulate
propositions of political justice embraced by the court in the name of
the Constitution. 2 The court is obliged to offer reasons for accepting
or rejecting her claim that she is the beneficiary of that scheme,53 and
the court, in turn, is generally bound in future cases by the reasons it
46. See id. at 199-200.
47. See id. at 200.
48. See id. at 200-01.
49. See CNN.com, Election Results, at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECFION/2004/pages/results/president/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2005).
50. See Sager, supra note 5, at 203-05.





has given in past decisions, which is a discipline that not only
encourages epistemic impartiality but that also encourages the
democratic virtue of a careful response to the merits of the
constitutional claim.54 Just as legislatures offer the hope of electoral
equality, courts offer these virtues, the virtues of deliberative
equality. The idea is not that courts are ipso facto more democratic
than legislatures, or that democracy can only be realized by the
inclusion of courts.56 Rather, the argument is simply that democracy is
not compromised by a nation that includes a robust constitutional
judiciary within its portfolio of political institutions.57 At most, there
is involved in this institutional decision a trade-off between modes of
participation in the processes by which the fundamentals of political
justice are identified and secured within a political community.58
Once again, this is an argument that could be put to contest.
Perhaps Kramer is not moved by the virtues of deliberative equality.
Or perhaps Kramer somehow believes that legislatures or the
electorate at large are as capable of respecting those virtues as are
courts. These do not strike me as plausible views, and they have not
persuaded those charged with the responsibilities of shaping
constitutional practice, especially in those countries where democracy
has been hard and recently won. But there is surely room for
illuminating discussion of these matters, especially if we abandon the
shibboleths of aristocracy and self-rule.
VI. KRAMER'S WEAPONS OF CHOICE
If matters rested just here, and were rhetoric set to the side, Kramer
and I would not seem in the end to be so very far apart. For all of his
faith in the constitutional judgments that could emanate from the
electorate via the officials they elect, Kramer purports to support
judicial review. He only draws the line at something he calls "judicial
supremacy."59 And I, notwithstanding the epistemic and democratic
virtues of constitutional adjudication, believe that most important
political questions belong to legislatures, not courts, that only a subset
of those questions that fall within the rubric of political justice can
properly be assigned to the Constitution, and that only a subset of
those questions that are properly assigned to the Constitution are
appropriate matters for judicial enforcement. But for Kramer, the
abstract line between judicial review and "judicial supremacy" gives
on to a recipe for institutional conflict that finds justification in neither
his history nor his discussion, a prescription that I find hard to fathom:
54. See id. at 211-12.
55. See id. at 202-06.
56. See id. at 205-06.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 205.
59. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 128-44.
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The Constitution leaves room for countless political responses to an
overly assertive Court: Justices can be impeached, the Court's
budget can be slashed, the President can ignore its mandates,
Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with
new members or give it burdensome new responsibilities or revise its
procedures. 60
"Judicial supremacy," it turns out, consists not in any substantive
constitutional doctrine, or even in any general stance of the
constitutional judiciary with regard to the questions before it. Rather,
"judicial supremacy" consists of reluctance on the part of Congress to
make war on the Court. The Court, Kramer insists, has become
hopelessly "activis[t]"61 and has made its "'grab for power."' 62 It is
time now for the people (for which we can read Congress and the
President) to assert the supremacy of their judgment over the
meaning of the Constitution.63
So let us imagine that there exists a group within our political
community that thinks that a number of the Supreme Court's
decisions are wrong. This group strongly disagrees with (a) the school
prayer decisions; 64 (b) the abortion rights decisions;65 (c) the women's
right to equal treatment decisions;6 6 (d) the First Amendment flag-
burning decisions;67 and (e) the gay rights decisions.68
This group becomes, in current parlance, a critical part of one of the
two major political parties' "base," and comes thereby to have
significant influence on the behavior of that party's elected officials.
There then comes a moment when that party (we can call it the R
Party) narrowly elects the President-say by a ratio of 51% to 49%.
Further, the Rs find themselves in control of both houses of Congress.
What worries Kramer is that the Rs will be unduly preoccupied with
the niceties of institutional stability and the perceived virtues of an
independent judiciary. "Judicial supremacy" consists of not a doctrine
but a political predisposition, pursuant to which open attacks on the
judiciary are resorted to only in extremis. On Kramer's reading of our
current collective disposition, the Rs are unlikely to spend the months
following their electoral victory in crafting and enacting legislation
that would, say, add three Justices to the Court, followed by the
60. Id. at 249.
61. See id. at 227.
62. Id. at 249 (quoting Larry Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
4,169 (2001)).
63. See id. at 247-48.
64. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
65. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
67. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
68. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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appointment of three Justices who are likely to reverse the offending
decisions.69 The Rs, he thinks, are unlikely to strip the federal
judiciary of jurisdiction over these areas of constitutional disputation,
and are even unlikely to find occupations for or impose procedural
burdens upon the Court that will effectively disable it.7" This for
Kramer, remarkably, is a misfortune.7
There are several features of Kramer's argument that may be
misleading in this respect, which may obscure exactly what he is
asking for. One diversion is Kramer's apparent embrace of the New
Deal (Carolene Products footnote four72 ) "settlement," pursuant to
which the Court robustly enforces its view of a select set of individual
liberties, but defers broadly to state and federal legislative judgment
in other areas.73 Kramer's complaint is that the Court has overrun
these announced boundaries,74 by denying Congress Commerce
Clause authority in United States v. Lopez7 5 and United States v.
Morrison,76 and by tightening up on Congress's authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment77 in the City of Boerne v.
Flores line of cases.78  This is a reasonable complaint-in large
measure I agree with it, though it is by no means irresistible -and if
what it meant to be in favor of popular constitutionalism and in
opposition to "judicial supremacy" were that one opposed these
recent decisions, then the only serious criticism of Kramer's thesis
would be that his rhetoric was overblown. But though departure from
the New Deal settlement disturbs many in the professoriate, there is
no groundswell in the popular electorate to make the world safe for
grandstanding federal legislation banning guns near schools. If the
end of "judicial supremacy" means the beginning of dismemberment
of the judiciary, it will be hot button issues in the domains of speech,
religion, and equality that will be its target. So much for the New
Deal settlement.
Another diversion from the brute thrust of Kramer's claim is his
frequent suggestion that it is the "doctrine" of "judicial supremacy"
that is at fault.79 This suggests that there is in fact a legal doctrine
69. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 231.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 231, 249.
72. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
73. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 219-20.
74. See id. at 225-26.
75. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
76. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
77. See supra note 22.
78. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel, Jr.
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power
and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79 (1997);
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 21.
79. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 253.
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specifying various results in named circumstances that needs
reshaping. In fact, though, all that Kramer has to complain about by
way of this "doctrine" are expressions of judicial authority-and
worse, claims about our constitutional history-within opinions of the
Supreme Court. His prime exhibits are Cooper v. Aaron8U and Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the five-Justice majority in United States v.
Morrison.8" Kramer's allergy to this rhetoric seems extreme. In
context, Cooper v. Aaron seems at worst a forgivable insistence on the
robust, non-deferential role of the judiciary with regard to critical
issues of racial justice, in the heartland of the New Deal settlement.
Even Morrison has a complicated but plausible relationship to this
settlement, because what Rehnquist is actually asserting is that it is
appropriate for the Court in Section Five cases to insist that
Congress's legislation be reasonably understood as addressing what
the Court would regard as a constitutional mandate in the area of
individual rights. I find it hard to believe that this rhetoric has had
much effect on anyone, least of all Congress and its constituencies,
which is where Kramer seems to think that the real trouble lies.
VII. COURTING DISASTER
Having laid such great emphasis on rhetoric, Kramer seems at one
point to locate his complaint about "judicial supremacy" in actual
judicial outcomes, if not in anything that properly amounts to a
"doctrine of judicial supremacy." Referring again to Rehnquist's
opinion in Morrison, he describes his charge against the Court as
follows:
The Chief Justice's history is, as we have seen, deeply
problematic. But that matters less than the neat way this passage
encapsulates the overriding jurisprudence of the modern Supreme
Court: a jurisprudence that treats constitutional limits as
synonymous with judicial enforcement and that, as a result, calls for
the Court to adopt an aggressive stance vis-A-vis the political
branches.82
But what are the instances of this "aggressive stance" that merit a
congressional response on the drastic order of jurisdiction-stripping,
court-packing, and more generally, court-crushing? Here, Kramer is
oddly elusive. At one point, however, he finds it useful to characterize
the Burger Court as the court that "fabricated the law of sex equality"
and "invented a right to abortion."83 And perhaps this is Kramer's
real complaint: The Court has rendered a series of controversial
decisions implicating religious liberty, speech, equality, and autonomy.
80. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
81. 529 U.S. 598; see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 221, 225-26.
82. Kramer, supra note 1, at 226.
83. Id. at 229.
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These decisions offend the political base of the Republicans, and
perhaps Kramer himself. What seems to bother Kramer most is that
he knows groups upset about these decisions have failed to seize the
legal pitchforks available to them and wreak vengeance on the Court.
If so, then we are back to the view that "judicial supremacy" consists
of the failure of those who disagree with the Court to lash out at the
Court as an institution.
If there is a set of decisions with which Kramer is willing to
announce his disagreement on the grounds of "judicial supremacy," it
is Lopez, Morrison, and the Boerne line of Fourteenth Amendment,
Section Five cases.' These cases he sees as trespassing directly on the
judgment of Congress and as threatening the New Deal settlement.85
Again, there is ample room for criticism in these cases; but it seems a
bit on the order of Chicken Little to characterize them not just as
wrong but as catastrophically wrong. After all, the Court has always
insisted that the Commerce Clause 86 is not a warrant to do whatever
Congress wants to do, and Lopez and Morrison addressed legislation
that pushed at the margins of its already generous envelope; and
subsequently, in Pierce County v. Guillen, the Court displayed a far
more accommodating stance toward Congress.87 And the Boerne line,
despite its faults, has also taken a more accommodating turn in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.8  In Justice in
Plainclothes, I have written at some length about these cases.89 As a
group, they fall far short of the best adjustment of institutional
responsibility. But they do not call for the strong medicine Kramer
insists upon, and, as we have already observed, no one but us
academics cares much about them. These cases, it bears emphasis,
will not be the target of an aroused Congress; Lawrence v. Texas9° and
the rights of gays will.
Not surprisingly, Bush v. Gore91 also enters Kramer's story, but in
an odd way. Kramer pointedly declines to take sides on the merits of
the case, but nevertheless sees in the failure of the Democrats to
ignore or punish the Court proof positive of the degree to which the
Court is being accorded too much authority in our political affairs.92
This is a curious position, one which somewhat undermines Kramer's
vision of popular deliberation over matters of constitutional
substance. His assumption is that every member of Congress who
wanted Gore to prevail in the election should have been willing to
84. See id. at 225-26.
85. See id.
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87. See Pierce County v. Guilien, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
88. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
89. See Sager, supra note 5, at 114-26.
90. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
91. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
92. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 231-32.
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attack the Court, notwithstanding their view of the constitutional
merits, their sense of the importance of orderly transitions of power,
and their sense of the probable outcome if the Supreme Court had
refused to act 93 (which I have no doubt would have been the better
course). Having prescinded from the merits, Kramer cannot see the
case as an instance of overreaching. What Bush v. Gore seems most
prominently to represent for these purposes is Kramer's unrequited
taste for institutional discord.
Kramer's preferred response to Bush v. Gore-ignore or punish the
Court for backing the wrong candidate-indicates much of the
problem with his rough-and-ready prescription for popular
constitutionalism. It is an open and fair question whether we or other
constitutional designers would be better or worse off if there were a
provision for a sober, reflective override of the constitutional judiciary
by a popular political process. For reasons I set out in Justice in
Plainclothes, and offer here only in a highly abbreviated form, I am
not on the whole drawn to such an arrangement; 94 but governments
are only beginning to experiment with such mechanisms in the United
Kingdom and Canada, and they may prove themselves in the field.
What I am more convinced of is that there is no failure of democracy,
no dominance of an unhappily aristocratic sensibility, no deep
structural shortcoming in our present institutional arrangements. And
what I am most firmly convinced of is that Kramer's call for
congressional attacks on the Court is deeply misguided.
Most of Kramer's book is devoted to history, and much of that
history is attractive and interesting. But at the last moment comes his
call for Congress to take up arms against the Court. And it is easy to
read that call as the point of the book. The weapons that Kramer calls
on Congress to take up do not invite or facilitate deliberation. Far
from selecting for reproof those judicial decisions that are inconsistent
with the New Deal settlement, those weapons will surely target the
Court's unpopular decisions on behalf of liberty and equality. Far
from prompting dialogue or encouraging deference, those weapons
are intended to silence or displace the Court on the strength of brute
political force. An open call for their deployment is at best perverse
and at worst irresponsible.
93. See id.
94. See Sager, supra note 5, at 213.
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